New Deal lessons for the Affordable Care Act: The General Welfare Clause pp.4-9 by Leonard, Elizabeth Weeks
ast winter, I participated in 
a panel of law professors 
brought together to 
consider the recently enacted 
federal health care law, the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010 (ACA). 
The Potential for 
Constitutional Crisis
The questions put to 
our panel were these: Is a 
constitutional crisis on the order of 1937 looming? Are there 
structural similarities between the present period and the New 
Deal period? 
My short answer to the ﬁrst question is: No, there is not a 
constitutional crisis. 
My longer answer to both questions is that any crisis, or 
constitutionally signiﬁcant structural similarity, concerns the 
spending power, not the commerce power, where most of the 
public attention has focused. 
More importantly, the controversy surrounding the ACA, if a 
crisis at all, is political, not constitutional. 
With crisis comes opportunity. In this case, the controversy 
provides an opportunity for us to carefully consider whether 
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the United States’ traditional, predominantly private-market 
approach to health care is an approach we want to continue to 
employ. 
Put another way, the now-raging debate may lead us to 
recognize that expansion of the federal welfare state toward a 
universal “Medicare for All” approach is not only plausible but 
preferable.
First, why I say that no constitutional crisis is looming: The 
economic conditions and abject nationwide suffering beginning 
with the crash of 1929 compelled the law to ﬁnd a way to 
address societal needs. Individual liberties came to encompass 
freedom from want and demand for afﬁrmative government 
intervention.1 
In 2012, there is no similarly compelling, nationwide crisis, 
demanding government response. Ever-increasing health care 
costs, consuming an ever-increasing share of gross domestic 
product and rising numbers of uninsured, while serious 
national concerns, are not comparable to the Great Depression. 
Most Americans agree something needs to be done to ﬁx 
the U.S. health care system. But there is no similar urgency 
for the U.S. Supreme Court to radically redeﬁne the scope of 
individual rights and governmental power. 
The Great Depression forced our nation to rethink across 
the board the relationship of citizens and government. 
The current health care “crisis” does not involve concepts as 
looming or stakes as large.
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In conceiving a present-day constitutional crisis, one might 
view the New Deal as representing unprecedented expansion 
of federal power, and the constitutional challenges to the 
Affordable Care Act as inviting the Supreme Court to contract 
federal power. 
I maintain that the ACA’s minimum essential coverage 
provision,2 or “individual mandate,” is constitutional under 
existing precedent.3
 
The issue, then, is whether the Supreme Court takes this 
opportunity to set forth new limits on the commerce power. 
I also believe the 26 states’ challenge to ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion4 is unsupported by precedent. 
But again, the issue is whether the Supreme Court will 
decide to impose new limits on the conditional spending 
power.5 
Even framing the issues in these terms, the current 
controversy simply is not driven by an overwhelming public 
demand to decrease federal power in response to societal needs 
or wants, similar to the demand to expand federal power 
during the New Deal.
Let me take these points one step further: Even if there 
were a legitimate question whether the individual mandate, in 
particular, exceeds the commerce power, the objection is to the 
form, not the substance, of expanded federal power. 
Congress could get to the same result in other ways, which 
similarly depend on broad federal power.6 
For example, Congress could condition the requirement to 
obtain health insurance on taking advantage of some privilege 
(for example, securing federal student loans) or engaging in 
some activity (including accessing medical care) or it could 
truly style the law as a federal tax, with a credit for obtaining 
insurance and redistribution under the spending power, 
essentially “Medicare for All.” 
Any of these alternatives would quite clearly pass 
constitutional muster, but federal power would still be 
expanded at least as much as by the currently enacted 
individual mandate. 
It was the political process, not the Constitution, that 
blocked these approaches. 
Consider the possibility of Medicare for All: Accepting a 
government health care program (whether administered entirely 
by the federal government or in cooperation with states, i.e., 
Medicaid for All) as a constitutional alternative to the individual 
mandate,7 the real question before the Supreme Court, the 
real possibility for limiting federal power, does not concern the 
commerce power but rather the spending power. 
New Deal Decisions
Viewing the current controversy through this lens, the 
structural issues before the Supreme Court during the New Deal 
may indeed provide useful lessons for the current period. 
The most important work of New Deal cases with respect to 
health care policy was not the expansion of commerce power8 or 
the demise of economic liberties,9 but the establishment of the 
federal welfare state under the spending power. 
The New Deal cases affected this outcome in two respects: 
ﬁrst, by adopting a broad interpretation of the “General Welfare 
Clause” as a freestanding source of congressional authority; 
and, second, by endorsing a cooperative federalism approach to 
addressing social problems.
Especially important for health care were the New Deal cases 
upholding the Social Security Act (SSA),10 the statute that now 
includes two core government health care programs, Medicare 
and Medicaid. 
“… the structural issues before the 
Supreme Court during the New 
Deal may indeed provide useful 
lessons for the current period.” 
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The 1935 SSA extended very limited public health funding 
to states,25 and those provisions faced no constitutional 
challenge. 
Post-New Deal Health Care Legislation
Post-New Deal federal health care legislation was similarly 
modest and targeted particular health care infrastructure 
needs or groups, including the very elderly, deemed especially 
deserving of government assistance.26 
By and large, federal legislation over the past century has 
been centered on supporting access to private health insurance, 
especially through tax-based subsidization of employer-based 
health insurance programs.27
The 1965 enactment of Medicare and Medicaid represents 
the high-water mark of direct federal involvement in providing 
and paying for health care. 
Johnson’s Great Society programs did not arise out of the 
same nationwide economic depression as the New Deal but in 
many ways took up the unﬁnished business of Roosevelt’s social 
policy agenda.28 
In the civil rights era, there was a sense that lack of access to 
essential social services perpetuated inequality just as much as 
direct discrimination.
Congress addressed lack of access to medical care with three 
programs: Medicare Part A, covering inpatient hospital care; 
Medicare Part B, covering physician services; and Medicaid, 
providing government health insurance to the “deserving” 
poor.29 
These programs established a nationwide single-payer health 
care system, albeit limited to the elderly, disabled and certain 
poor Americans. 
The programs were enacted as amendments to the SSA, and 
Congress’ spending power authority to establish them under 
Butler, Helvering and Steward Machine was never questioned. 
Indeed, since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has struck 
down no federal program as exceeding the spending power.30
The only signiﬁcant political objection to Medicare and 
Medicaid came from the physician community, which feared 
government control of the practice of medicine and intrusion 
on the physician-patient relationship.31 
Those concerns were addressed by giving considerable 
concessions to doctors, including the addition of Part B itself, 
Three cases were of pivotal importance. First, a pre-cursor 
decision in 1936, United States v. Butler,11 although striking down 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Agricultural Adjustment 
Act on 10th Amendment grounds (and under the Supreme 
Court’s then-prevailing view that agricultural production was not 
“commerce”), endorsed a broad Hamiltonian interpretation of 
spending power as not merely ancillary to the other enumerated 
powers.12 As long as Congress was addressing a general, not 
merely a speciﬁc, concern, the spending power could reach it.13 
Second, a pair of companion cases in 1937 carried the Butler 
General Welfare Clause interpretation forward to uphold the SSA. 
In Helvering v. Davis,14 the Supreme Court validated both Title 
VIII, imposing mandatory payroll taxes on employers, and the 
separate Title II, authorizing payment of government pensions to 
old-age workers. The Supreme Court held that both the taxing 
and spending provisions of the SSA fell within the General 
Welfare Clause,15 recognizing that the problem of the elderly in 
need of support was clearly nationwide.16 
In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,17 the Supreme Court 
likewise upheld the federal unemployment compensation tax on 
employers. Under the SSA, employers received a credit against 
the federal tax for any amount paid to a state unemployment 
compensation program.18 The Supreme Court rejected claims 
that the provision was an unconstitutional tax, or that it invaded 
states’ reserved powers or otherwise coerced states.19 
Steward Machine, accordingly, established the constitutional 
basis for the conditional spending power. The federal government 
could achieve broad policy objectives, not by commandeering or 
directly regulating states, but by incentivizing with secured funds 
states’ participation in federal programs. 
The success of the SSA cooperative federalism strategy soon 
became evident. In 1930, before the New Deal, only one state 
(Wisconsin) had a state unemployment compensation program.20 
By 1937, after enactment of the SSA, 43 states had passed 
unemployment compensation laws.21
But where was health care in the New Deal? 
The Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the General 
Welfare Clause and constitutional approval of the SSA old-age 
pension and unemployment compensation provisions seemingly 
would similarly have supported a national health care program. 
Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union Address and aspirational 
“Second Bill of Rights” included “[t]he right to adequate medical 
care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health.”22 
But the framers of the 1935 SSA put that goal to one side due 
to political objections, including widespread fear of socialized 
medicine and fragile political support for the act itself.23 
Health care would not be added to the SSA until 30 years later 
as part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty. 
Before the New Deal, federal funding for health care was 
limited to public health aims, including infectious disease control 
focused on the immigrant population, with some assistance to 
pregnant women, infants and disabled children.24 
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covering physician and outpatient services, along with the 
originally proposed Part A coverage for inpatient hospital care. 
The law also allowed physicians to bill patients directly for the 
cost of care not covered by Medicare.32 
Medicare and Medicaid also maintained active roles for 
private insurers and providers as government contractors to 
administer the programs and process claims.33 Private insurance 
companies, including Blue Cross and Blue Shield, some of 
the earliest insurance companies, which were founded by 
associations of hospitals and physicians, have long served as 
Medicare and Medicaid contractors.
The absence of any comparable expansion of the federal 
welfare state since 1965 is not because such programs would be 
unconstitutional. Rather, federal health reform policy has been 
driven by a deep commitment to private solutions, especially by 
shoring up the now-dominant employer-based system, through 
which the majority of insured 
Americans receive their coverage.34 
In terms of federal health care 
legislation, the 2003 enactment 
of Medicare Part D, an optional 
outpatient prescription drug 
beneﬁt, was as dramatic as it has 
gotten.35 And this George W. Bush-
era program reﬂects a conspicuously 
private-market “managed 
competition” model,36 complete 
with a gaping 100%-self-pay “doughnut hole.”37 
The federal government pays a portion of beneﬁciaries’ 
routine, low-cost prescription drugs, and an even larger portion 
of catastrophic, high-cost drugs but provides no assistance for 
drug costs between those two extremes. 
By design, private “pharmacy beneﬁt managers” compete to 
enroll Medicare beneﬁciaries in their Part D prescription drug 
plans. 
It is clear that even within big government programs, the 
private market continues to dominate health care delivery.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Against that historical backdrop, the sleeper issue in the 
Affordable Care Act litigation that provides the real potential 
for contraction of federal authority concerns the scope of the 
spending power. 
Before the three days of oral arguments in March, which 
offered their own surprises, the Supreme Court’s most unlikely 
move was granting certiorari to the states’ Medicaid challenge in 
the Florida lawsuit. 
No circuit court had ruled in the states’ favor on that 
question, and similar challenges to even broader, more sweeping 
expansions of Medicaid in the past have not succeeded.38 
The states’ argument rests on a suggestion in Steward 
Machine,39 revived in South Dakota v. Dole,40 that federal 
conditions on funding to states could, at some as-yet-unidentiﬁed 
point, become so coercive as to violate the anti-commandeering 
limit on the commerce power. 
Acknowledging that the Medicaid program has been in place 
for more than 50 years, with every state voluntarily agreeing to go 
along with both it and many changes to federal requirements over 
the life of the program,41 a discontented group of states argued 
that the ACA’s particular expansion of Medicaid has “pass[ed] the 
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”42 
If the Supreme Court takes this opportunity to limit the 
spending power and restrict the congressional amendment of 
existing cooperative programs, that decision could have signiﬁcant 
implications that could give rise to a constitutional crisis.
The New Deal established a ﬁrm foundation for cooperative 
federalism, on which Medicaid and so many other programs  
are built. 
Writing in 1958, Arthur Miller quoted 
President Woodrow Wilson, opining, at 
the turn of the century, that “the question 
of the relation of the States to the federal 
government is the cardinal question of our 
constitutional system.”43 But by the time 
Miller wrote, 50 years later, he maintained 
“that question has largely been settled.”44 
To Miller, Helvering and Steward 
Machine, upholding the SSA, “gave ﬁnal constitutional approval to 
the outlines of cooperative federalism. Once breached, the dam has 
never been repaired; the trickle became a stream and then a ﬂood.”45 
Going forward, Miller envisioned states as not much more 
than federal “housekeepers.”46 By and large, any new, important 
activities of state governments are federally funded: “When 
new problems arise, eyes swivel to Washington, not to the state 
capitol.”47
Consistent with Miller’s prescience, ACA derives from federal 
legislation but relies heavily on state cooperation to put in place 
comprehensive reforms. 
That expectation is not limited to Medicaid. State-based health 
insurance exchanges are intended to be the central pillars of the 
reformed private market for individual and small-group health 
insurance.48 
Also, states were invited to assist the federal government in 
establishing stop-gap, high-risk insurance pools, almost as soon as 
ACA was enacted.49 
Recently, federal authorities passed on the task of deﬁning a 
fundamental component of the private market health reforms, the 
“essential health beneﬁts” package, to the states.50 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s ruling on Medicaid 
expansion would have implications for the operation of those 
provisions of ACA, as well as a host of other long-standing 
cooperative federal-state programs.
“The New Deal established 
a ﬁrm foundation for 
cooperative federalism, on 
which Medicaid and so many 
other programs are built.”
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Moreover, there is no pressing need to contract or expand 
federal power in order to address major and novel societal 
problems. There is nothing for which the law needs to ﬁnd a 
new way. 
The crisis – or more properly, the opportunity – is political. 
Most Americans agree we need to do something about the 
health care system. And most people are deeply troubled by 
many commercial insurance practices, including the manner in 
which insurers currently exclude individuals and price health 
insurance policies for those who arguably need coverage the 
most.56
To address those concerns, the one solution that made 
it through Congress – a solution initially proposed by a 
conservative think-tank in response to Clinton’s health reforms57 
– was to require most everyone to purchase insurance before 
they think they need it and to put in place federal tax incentives 
and subsidies to help individuals comply.
Politically, that approach reveals that we remain more 
comfortable with a private, competitive market for health care, 
rather than Medicare for All. 
So either we get comfortable with Medicare for All and 
tackle all of the challenges of a single-payer system or we 
continue to put incentives, subsidies and nudges in place, 
perhaps even excising the individual mandate from ACA, and 
see if people come around on their own.58 
The political opportunity in the ACA litigation, however 
the Supreme Court rules on the individual mandate, lies 
in highlighting to the electorate the alternative of a more 
comprehensive, general welfare approach to health care. 
Where that opportunity could derail into crisis is if the 
Supreme Court, for the ﬁrst time in 75 years, substantially 
limits Congress’ authority to enact or administer new federal or 
cooperative federal-state health care programs.
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